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This article analyses three important developments in EU free movement law from 
the perspective of the structure of free movement law. Each of these developments – 
market access, horizontal direct effect and the assimilation of justifications – is caused 
by structural changes in the application of the free movement provisions. Firstly, the 
Court of Justice of the European Union has used 'backwards reasoning', which means 
that the Court no longer maintains the consecutive order of the structure. Moreover, 
the Court has increasingly merged what were previously distinct stages of inquiry in 
free movement cases. The result is that the proportionality test has become the most 
likely tool to solve free movement cases. This process of centralisation can be explained 
by the Court's aim to guarantee the effet utile of the free movement provisions. 
However, the centralisation of proportionality has a number of important 
consequences. Ultimately, the (almost) exclusive reliance on proportionality to solve 
free movement cases does not improve the functioning of the internal market. 
Therefore, the Court should also develop and rely on the other pillars of the structure 
of free movement law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Free movement law has been built on solid foundations. Because of the open-
ended nature of the Treaty provisions on free movement, the foundations of 
free movement law have primarily been developed through the case law of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union ('the Court'). They have resulted in 
what could be described as 'the structure of free movement law' – a 
framework of assessment that is used to assess free movement cases. In 
comparison with other sub-disciplines in EU law, it is this structure that 
makes free movement law such a clear and accessible subject. The structure 
is not only helpful to teach free movement law, but it is also used in practice. 
For example, in its preliminary reference in Viking,1 the English Court of 
Appeal asked a number of questions that were structured precisely in 
accordance with the structure of free movement law.2 This shows that the 
structure of free movement does not only facilitate students in studying free 
movement law, but that it is also applied by lawyers and courts in practice 
Nevertheless, free movement cases are rarely analysed from the perspective 
of their structure. Such a structural approach is inevitably rather technical. 
However, this exercise in 'dissection' shows how various developments in 
free movement law are connected and how they lead to the same result. The 
structure of free movement law is a technique that is used by the Court to 
protect the functioning of the internal market. Transformations in this 
structure show how the Court has changed its approach to guarantee the effet 
utile of the free movement provisions. As such, a structural approach to 
                                                 
1 Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers' Federation and Finnish Seamen's Union 
v Viking Line ABP, EU:C:2007:772. 
2 Ibid, para 27. 
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analysing free movement cases reveals the Court's vision of how free 
movement should be protected in the internal market. 
The structure of free movement law has four different pillars. These pillars 
constitute four separate stages of inquiry. Furthermore, they are consecutive 
and cumulative. Therefore, a party can only successfully establish a breach of 
the free movement provisions if each of the four stages is passed. First of all, 
cases have to come within the scope of the free movement provisions. This 
normally means that cases must have a cross-border element. Secondly, the 
free movement provisions have to be directly effective – a party who is claiming 
that their free movement rights have been breached has to be able to rely on 
the free movement provisions against the defendant. The third step is to see 
if there has been a restriction on free movement. Fourthly, a restriction can 
still be justified by reference to one of the express derogations in the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union ('TFEU') or one of the public 
interest requirements developed in the case law of the Court. Before 
measures are justified, it has to be shown that they comply with the principle 
of proportionality. It is within this structure that free movement cases are 
solved. 
The starting point of this article is that developments in the Court's case law 
make it necessary to rethink the structure of free movement law. The 
argument is based on two observations. Firstly, there is an increasing amount 
of interaction between what were previously distinct stages of inquiry in free 
movement cases. Secondly, the consecutive order of the structure of free 
movement law is no longer maintained. The result is that the assessment of 
the existence of a restriction has an impact on the question of whether a case 
comes within the scope of free movement law in the first place. Similarly, the 
question whether there is a restriction on free movement might determine 
whether the free movement provisions have direct effect. The Court has 
increasingly applied this 'backwards' reasoning, which challenges the 
consecutive order of the structure. As a consequence, the four pillars of the 
structure of free movement law have become more merged.  
This process of interaction will be analysed to explain three important 
developments in free movement law. These developments – or 
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transformations – have been discussed extensively over the last decade or so.3 
However, an analysis from the perspective of the structure of free movement 
law is able to show that the three developments are in fact interconnected 
and, moreover, that they lead to the same result. Firstly, the interaction 
between scope and restriction has resulted in a market-access approach in 
free movement law. Secondly, the interaction between direct effect and 
restriction has brought about an increasing number of cases in which the free 
movement provisions were held to have horizontal direct effect. Thirdly, the 
interaction between restriction and justification has resulted in the 
assimilation of the express derogations in the Treaty and the public interest 
justifications developed in the Court's case law. As a consequence, the nature 
of a restriction is no longer relevant for the kind of justifications defendants 
in free movement cases can rely on. 
The next step is to show that all three developments lead to the same result: 
they make the proportionality test the most likely tool to solve free 
movement cases. The Court is increasingly confident to make the 
proportionality test decisive. The underlying reason for this development is 
that the Court believes that the proportionality test is the most suitable tool 
to guarantee the effective application of the free movement provisions. This 
process of centralisation of proportionality has important consequences, 
which will be analysed in the final part of the article. The focus will not be on 
                                                 
3 See, for example, on market access: Jukka Snell, 'The Notion of Market Access: a 
Concept or a Slogan?' (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 437; Gareth Davies, 
'Understanding Market Access: Exploring the Economic Rationality of Different 
Conceptions of Free Movement Law' (2010) 11 German Law Journal 671; Max 
Jansson and Harri Kalimo, 'De Minimis Meets 'Market Access': Transformations 
in the Substance – and the Syntax – of EU Free Movement Law?' (2014) 51 Common 
Market Law Review 523; on horizontal direct effect: Julio Bacquero Cruz, 'Free 
movement and Private Autonomy' (1999) 24 European Law Review 603; Christoph 
Krenn, 'A Missing Piece in the Horizontal Effect 'Jigsaw': Horizontal Direct Effect 
and the Free Movement of Goods' (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 177; on 
the (potential) assimilation of justifications: Eleanor Spaventa, 'On Discrimination 
and the Theory of Mandatory Requirements' (2002) 3 Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies 45; Laurence Gormley, 'Inconsistencies and 
Misconceptions in the Free Movement of Goods' (2015) 40 European Law Review 
925. More precise references can be found below. 
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the substance of the proportionality test,4 but rather on the role that 
proportionality plays in the re-thought structure of free movement law. It 
will be argued that there is a risk in relying too much on proportionality to 
determine the outcome of free movement cases. The Court should not be 
afraid to explore its complete free movement toolbox and should also rely on 
other tools in the structure of free movement law (such as scope, direct effect 
and justification) to solve free movement cases. This variation in case-solving 
strategies will ultimately improve the functioning of the internal market.  
II. THE STRUCTURE OF FREE MOVEMENT LAW 
Before the processes of interaction in the structure of free movement law can 
be analysed, it is necessary to set out the structure of free movement law as it 
has been developed by the Court. The approach will be horizontal across the 
various freedoms, although particular features of certain free movement 
provisions will be highlighted.  
First of all, the free movement provisions are only applicable if cases come 
within their scope. The Court has developed three main mechanisms to find 
that cases fall outside the scope of the free movement provisions. The first is 
the 'wholly internal situation' rule.5 The free movement provisions do not 
apply to situations that are internal to one Member State. If all aspects of a 
case relate to domestic matters, the cross-border element, which is necessary 
to justify the application of the free movement provisions, is missing. This 
approach has been used primarily for cases concerning the free movement of 
                                                 
4 See Takis Tridimas, General Principles of EU Law (Oxford University Press 2006), 
Chapter 5; Nicholas Emiliou, The Principle of Proportionality in European Law 
(Kluwer 1996). 
5 Niamh Nic Shuibhne, The Coherence of EU Free Movement Law (Oxford University 
Press 2013), Chapter 4. See also Niamh Nic Shuibhne, 'Free Movement of Persons 
and the Wholly Internal Rule: Time to Move On?' (2002) 39 Common Market Law 
Review 741; Camille Dautricourt and Sébastien Thomas, 'Reverse Discrimination 
and Free Movement of Persons under Community Law: All for Ulysses, Nothing 
for Penelope?' (2009) 34 European Law Review 433. The rationale of the rule was 
strongly criticised by Advocate General Sharpston in her Opinion in Case C-212/06 
Government of the French Community and Walloon Government v Flemish Government, 
EU:C:2007:398. 
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persons.6 Secondly, the free movement provisions do not apply to national 
rules if their effect on free movement is 'too indirect and uncertain'.7 This is 
another way of saying that cases lack a sufficient cross-border element for the 
free movement provisions to be applicable.8 Because the focus is on the effect 
of a national rule, it could be argued that this approach already combines the 
concepts of scope and restriction.9However, it is clear that this approach 
focusses on the scope of the free movement provisions. The best way to show 
this is to analyse the third mechanism which the Court has developed only 
for goods. This mechanism is the so-called Keck proviso.10 Rules which affect 
the circumstances under which products can be sold fall outside the scope of 
Article 34 TFEU, as long as they apply to all relevant traders and do not 
discriminate in law or in fact against products coming from another Member 
State.11 If the Keck proviso is fulfilled, a case falls outside Article 34 TFEU 
because the effect on cross-border trade is too indirect or uncertain.12 
Because there is no de minimis rule for goods, such cases fall outside the scope 
of Article 34 TFEU altogether. Therefore, relying on the concept of 
remoteness is another way of saying that cases fall outside the scope of the 
free movement provisions.13 This confirms that national rules whose effect 
                                                 
6 Case 175/78 The Queen v Saunders, EU:C:1979:88; Case C-299/95 Friedrich Kremzow 
v Republik Österreich, EU:C:1997:254. See Síofra O'Leary, 'The Past, Present and 
Future of the Purely Internal Rule in EU Law' (2009) Irish Jurist 13. 
7 Eleanor Spaventa, 'From Gebhard to Carpenter: Towards a (Non)Economic 
European Constitution' (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 743. See also 
Eleanor Spaventa, 'The Outer Limits of the Free Movement of Persons: Some 
Reflections on the Significance of Keck, Remoteness and Deliège', in Catherine 
Barnard and Okeoghene Odudu (eds), The Outer Limits of European Union Law (Hart 
Publishing 2008) 245-272. 
8 Case C-69/88 H. Krantz GmbH v Ontvanger der Directe Belastingen and Netherlands 
State, EU:C:1990:97 (goods) and Case C-190/98 Volker Graf v Filzmoser 
Maschinenbau GmbH, EU:C:2000:49 (workers).  
9 See Nic Shuibhne (n 5) Chapter 4. See also Catherine Barnard, 'Fitting the 
Remaining Pieces into the Goods and Persons Jigsaw?' (2001) 26 European Law 
Review 35, 52. 
10 Case C-267/91 Criminal Proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard, 
EU:C:1993:905. 
11 Ibid, para 16. 
12 Ibid, para 17. 
13 Gormley (n 3) 925, 936. 
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on free movement is 'too indirect and uncertain' also fall outside the scope of 
the free movement provisions.14  
If a case falls within the scope of the free movement provisions, the next step 
is to determine if the free movement provisions can be relied on against the 
defendant. In other words, are the free movement provisions directly 
effective against the defendant? The orthodox approach of the Court has 
been to hold that the free movement provisions have vertical direct effect and 
can be relied on against the State. However, they do not have horizontal 
direct effect. As a result, private parties are in principle not directly bound by 
the free movement provisions. This can most clearly be seen for goods, where 
the Court has always held that States are bound by the free movement 
provisions, while the conduct of private parties should be assessed under the 
competition law provisions. This statement does not adequately reflect the 
way the case law on direct effect has developed for the other freedoms. From 
early on in its case law, the Court has extended the application of the free 
movement provisions to private parties who were engaged in collective 
regulation and who exercised legal autonomy.15 Through this approach the 
free movement provisions have been applied to organisations such as the 
UCI and the UEFA.16 However, the Court has never explained what is meant 
by 'collective regulation' and 'legal autonomy'. Finally, there are some 
examples where the Court held that the free movement provisions were 
applicable to private parties in a purely horizontal situation even without a 
collective element. The best example is Angonese,17 in which Article 45 TFEU 
was applied to a horizontal dispute between a job applicant and a private 
employer. As a result, Article 45 TFEU has horizontal direct effect in 
employment situations,18 while Article 34 TFEU remains a 'fortress' of 
vertical direct effect only.19  
                                                 
14 Thomas Horsley, 'Unearthing Buried Treasure: Art. 34 TFEU and the 
Exclusionary Rules' (2012) 37 European Law Review 734, 741. 
15 Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch v Union cycliste internationale, EU:C:1974:140.  
16 Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch (n 15), and Case C-415/93 Union royale belge des societés 
de football association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman, EU:C:1995:463 (UEFA). 
17 Case C-281/98 Roman Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, EU:C:2000:296. 
18 Alan Dashwood, 'Viking and Laval: Issues of Horizontal Direct Effect' (2008) 10 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 525. 
19 Krenn (n 3). 
242 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Vol. 10 No. 1 
 
Thirdly, the Court proceeds with the question of whether free movement has 
been restricted. Is there a prima facie breach which has to be justified by the 
Member State? Again, three main approaches to identify a restriction can be 
distinguished. First, the Court has used a discrimination test. This test is 
primarily used for persons – also because discrimination is explicitly referred 
to in Article 45 TFEU.20 Both direct and indirect discrimination are 
prohibited. Direct discrimination means that there is a difference in 
treatment between national workers and non-national workers.21 The 
discrimination is visible in how the rule has been formulated – as such, it is 
often called discrimination in law. With indirect discrimination, the 
formulation of the rule is neutral and does not appear to make a distinction 
between national workers and non-national workers. However, the effect of 
the rule is such that it is more difficult for non-national workers to comply 
with it.22 This is called discrimination in fact. For goods, the Court does not 
use an approach based on discrimination. It uses the concepts of distinct and 
indistinct applicability. However, in essence, these concepts are the 
equivalent of direct and indirect discrimination for goods. A second 
approach which has been developed by the Court to identify a restriction is 
the so-called obstacle approach. Obstacles are national rules that make the 
exercise of free movement rights more difficult or less attractive. It is not 
strictly necessary to establish discrimination – in fact, the obstacle approach 
is also applied to genuinely non-discriminatory national rules.23 However, 
because the test does not require an assessment of whether there is 
discrimination, it is also possible that discriminatory rules are classified as 
obstacles. In the analysis below, it will be shown that this has an impact on 
the interaction between restriction and justification. The application of the 
obstacle test is quite flexible and it is relatively easy to establish a restriction.24 
Thirdly, a restriction on the free movement of goods can be established 
                                                 
20 In Bosman (n 16), the Court held that non-discriminatory obstacles to free 
movement of persons were also a restriction of Article 45 TFEU. 
21 See Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU (4th edn, Oxford University 
Press 2013) 279. 
22 See, for example, Case C-379/87 Anita Groener v Minister of Education, 
EU:C:1989:599. 
23 Case C-415/93 Bosman (n 16). 
24 Barnard (n 21) 281-282. 
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through the Keck proviso. Selling arrangements fall outside the scope of 
Article 34 TFEU as long as they apply to all relevant traders and they affect 
domestic and foreign products in the same manner. Therefore, Keck appears 
to rely on a discrimination test to bring national rules on selling arrangements 
back in the scope of Article 34 TFEU on the basis of the existence of a 
restriction. This is a good example of 'backwards' reasoning by the Court. 
The identification of a restriction brings the case back in the scope of free 
movement law. The next section will analyse how this interaction has 
resulted in the development of a market access approach. 
Fourthly, once a restriction on free movement has been established, the 
burden of proof is on the defendant to show that this restriction can be 
justified. The justification stage consists of two steps: first, the defendant has 
to show that there is a ground of justification. Second, the measure has to be 
proportionate. The proportionality test assesses whether the measure is 
suitable and necessary.25 The suitability test assesses the connection between 
the tool chosen and the aim to be achieved – the ground of justification. Is 
the measure taken suitable to achieve this aim? The necessity test focusses on 
the question whether any alternative measures could have been adopted that 
would have been less restrictive of free movement. As regards the grounds of 
justification that can be relied on, for each free movement provision a 
corresponding list of justifications has been included in the TFEU. These 
justifications are called express derogations. Because of the exhaustive nature 
of the Treaty derogations, and the fact that most of them were already 
included in the Treaties in the 1950s, the Court has developed a second case 
law-based category of justifications that can be used to justify restrictions on 
free movement. In Cassis de Dijon,26 the Court held that indistinctly 
applicable restrictions on free movement of goods could also be justified on 
the basis of so-called 'mandatory requirements'.27 They are a non-exhaustive 
list of good reasons that Member States – or private parties – can rely on to 
justify restrictions on free movement. It is always open to a Member State to 
                                                 
25 See Takis Tridimas, 'Proportionality in Community Law: Searching for the 
Appropriate Standard of Scrutiny', in Evelyn Ellis (ed), The Principle of 
Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Hart Publishing 1999). 
26 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein ('Cassis de 
Dijon'), EU:C:1979:42. 
27 Ibid, para 8. 
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claim that a particular policy consideration constitutes a mandatory 
requirement. However, it is ultimately for the Court to assess whether a 
mandatory requirement should be accepted under EU law. The most 
commonly relied on mandatory requirements are consumer protection and 
environmental protection. This category of justifications has now also been 
extended to the other freedoms, where mandatory requirements are referred 
to as public interest requirements or objective justifications. The basic rule 
remains that these justifications can only be used to justify restrictions that 
are indirectly discriminatory, indistinctly applicable or obstacles. Rules that 
make a direct distinction between domestic and foreign products, or rules 
that discriminate directly on the ground of nationality, cannot be justified by 
mandatory requirements. The Treaty derogations are the only justifications 
that can be relied on to justify such restrictions. The distinction becomes 
more difficult to maintain if directly discriminatory rules are classified as 
obstacles by the Court. This could lead to interaction between restriction 
and justification. This process of interaction will be analysed below. 
III. THREE DEVELOPMENTS IN FREE MOVEMENT LAW 
1. Market Access: Interaction between Scope and Restriction 
In this section, three developments will be analysed to illustrate the changes 
that have taken place in the structure of free movement law. Again, the 
approach will be horizontal. Nevertheless, to be able to make a convincing 
case that these transformations have taken place across all freedoms, for each 
section at least two cases that concerned different freedoms will be discussed. 
In the last two decades, the Court has increasingly made use of a market 
access test to identify restrictions on free movement. The concept of market 
access is not entirely new to EU law, since it has already been used in 
competition law.28 In free movement cases, the Court appears to use the 
market access test to establish restrictions on the free movement provisions 
– national rules that prevent or hinder market access are considered to 
restrict free movement. However, market access is more than just the 
identification of a restriction. It has become a concept through which the 
                                                 
28 Snell (n 3) 438-440. 
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Court is able to combine the issue of the scope of free movement law with the 
issue of a restriction on free movement. Therefore, market access is not solely 
about a restriction, but also incorporates the determination of whether a case 
falls within the scope of free movement law. This determination is based on 
the identification of a restriction on market access. As such, market access is 
an example of a tool whereby the Court uses 'backwards' reasoning – the 
Court starts with the identification of a restriction and uses its finding on 
that issue to bring a case within the scope of free movement law. The problem 
with this market access approach is that it has been applied in such a way that 
it does not only apply 'backwards' reasoning from restriction to scope, but 
that it also fuses the two concepts in such a way that they can no longer be 
distinguished. The result of this process of (con)fusion is that the Court's 
reasoning has become less clear and less predictable.29 
The 'father' – or 'mother' – of the market access test is the Court's judgment 
in Keck. This might come as a surprise to some, because Keck is generally 
considered as a case that attempted to limit the scope of application of 
Article 34 TFEU. The Court tried to do this by creating a new category of 
national rules – selling arrangements – that fell outside Article 34 TFEU. 
However, Keck was a balancing exercise between two different interests. On 
the one hand, the Court wanted to take into account the concerns of the 
Member States that were worried about the increasing number of national 
rules which were challenged under the free movement provisions. On the 
other hand, the Court did not want to create a regulatory safe zone for 
Member States, in which they could adopt rules that could not be reviewed 
by the Court. The result was a compromise that led to the Keck proviso. 
Selling arrangements are outside Article 34 TFEU if they apply to all relevant 
traders and if they affect domestic and foreign products in the same manner.  
The Keck proviso already represented a new kind of interaction between 
scope and restriction: the identification of disparate treatment would bring a 
case into the scope of Article 34 TFEU. As such, the Keck proviso for the first 
time established a test that went from restriction to scope. This is an example 
of the Court's 'backwards' reasoning. Nevertheless, in Keck, the two were still 
regarded as separate concepts – only if there is disparate treatment are selling 
arrangements brought back in the scope of Article 34 TFEU. There has 
                                                 
29 Snell (n 3) 470; Jansson and Kalimo (n 3) 557. 
246 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Vol. 10 No. 1 
 
always been discussion about the precise nature of the second Keck proviso.30 
In theory, the test requires the claimant to show that a selling arrangement 
has a negative effect on foreign products, and that there is indirect 
discrimination. However, in practice, the second proviso has been applied as 
a market access test by the Court.31 This can clearly be seen in De Agostini,32 
which concerned a Swedish prohibition of advertisements aimed at children 
under the age of 12. An Italian publisher of children magazines about 
dinosaurs was prevented from showing commercials aimed at young children 
on Swedish television. This was a selling arrangement that complied with the 
first Keck proviso, as Swedish magazines could not show commercials aimed 
at young children either. It was less clear whether the prohibition on 
advertising also complied with the second proviso. De Agostini claimed that 
'television advertising was the only effective form of promotion enabling it to 
penetrate the Swedish market'.33 The Court held that, if this were true, the 
prohibition would not affect domestic and foreign products in the same 
manner, and there would be a restriction of Article 34 TFEU. This 
assessment had to be made by the national court on the basis of the evidence 
provided to it.34 As a consequence, market access has become a criterion for 
the Keck proviso, but whether market access is restricted remains a factual 
assessment to be made by the national court. Furthermore, the two concepts 
of scope and restriction remain separate. 
Market access has moved on since then. In Commission v Italy (Trailers)35 and 
Mickelsson and Roos,36 the Court for the first time introduced market access as 
                                                 
30 Daniel Wilsher, 'Does Keck Discrimination Make Any Sense? An Assessment of 
the Non-Discrimination Principle within the European Single Market' (2008) 33 
European Law Review 3; Stefan Enchelmaier, 'The Awkward Selling of a Good 
Idea, or a Traditionalist Interpretation of Keck' (2003) 3 Yearbook of European 
Law 249; Stephen Weatherill, 'After Keck: Some Thoughts on How to Clarify the 
Clarification' (1996) 33 Common Market Law Review 885. 
31 Barnard (n 9) 44. 
32 Case C-9/98 Konsumentombudsmannen v De Agostini, EU:C:1997:344. 
33 Ibid, para 43. 
34 Ibid, paras 44-45. 
35 Case C-110/05 Commission v Italian Republic, EU:C:2009:66. 
36 Case C-142/05 Åklagaren v Percy Mickelsson and Joakim Roos, EU:C:2009:336. 
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a self-standing test to establish a restriction of Article 34 TFEU.37 It did so in 
the context of so-called bans or restrictions on use – national rules that did 
not ban the import of certain products, but that banned or restricted their 
use. Again, the Court reasoned from restriction to scope. However, the way 
this was done differed from the approach under the Keck proviso, since there 
was no clear distinction anymore between the two stages of inquiry.  
Mickelsson and Roos concerned a Swedish ban on using jet skis. They could only 
be used on general waterways and on waters that had specifically been 
allocated by the Swedish authorities. At the time of the case, no waters had 
in fact been allocated. Therefore, it was very difficult to use jet skis in Sweden. 
The claimants argued that this ban constituted a restriction on the free 
movement of goods. The Court agreed. It held that this ban had 'a 
considerable influence on the behaviour of consumers'.38 This may 'affect the 
access of that product to the market of that Member State'.39 The Court 
accepted that the question of whether the Swedish rule had a disparate 
impact on foreign products should be answered by the national court. 
However, it held that rules which ban or greatly restrict the use of certain 
products have the effect of hindering access to the market and constitute a 
restriction on the free movement of goods.  
Interestingly, while the Court left the assessment of whether a national rule 
banned or greatly restricted use to the national court, it automatically 
followed from such a finding that the rule hindered market access. This 
automatic link merges the concepts of scope and restriction. With the Keck 
proviso, it is the finding of a restriction that brings a case back in the scope of 
free movement law, but with this market access approach it is the 
presumption of a restriction on the basis of which a case is held to come 
within the scope of free movement law. The market access test is applied in 
abstracto.40 The Court did not investigate where the jet skis in this case had 
been produced. The Court did not investigate the number of imports of jet 
                                                 
37 See also Eleanor Spaventa, 'Leaving Keck behind? The Free Movement of Goods 
after the Rulings in Commission v. Italy and Mickelsson and Roos' (2009) 34 
European Law Review 914. 
38 Case C-142/05 Mickelsson and Roos (n 36), para 26. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Davies (n 3). 
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skis into Sweden. Mickelsson and Roos were both Swedish citizens who had 
used their jet skis on Swedish waters. As a result, the cross-border element 
was based on the abstract finding of a restriction on market access of parties 
that were not involved in the case. No assessment had to be conducted by the 
national court. The result is that market access has simply become a 
technique – or slogan41 – to fuse the concepts of scope and restriction in such 
a way that Member States are put in a position where they have to justify 
restrictions on free movement. 
The argument that market access is a technique rather than a test based on 
an economic or market assessment can most convincingly be made by making 
a link to the other freedoms. Carpenter42 is often referred to. This case 
concerned an English service provider who claimed that his right to provide 
services in other Member States would be restricted if his wife, who was not 
an EU citizen, were deported to her home country. Again, the Court used an 
abstract finding of a restriction – the possibility that Mr Carpenter would 
have to travel to other Member States to provide services there – to bring the 
case within the scope of the free movement provisions. Although the 
language of market access was not used, the technique adopted by the Court 
was essentially similar.  
This technique has even found its way into the Court's case law on 
citizenship. Ruiz Zambrano43 constitutes the 'citizenship equivalent' of 
market access. A Colombian family was at risk of being deported from 
Belgium. The two children had been born in Belgium and had Belgian 
nationality. They had never left the Belgian territory. The result was that it 
was difficult for the family to claim that their case came within the scope of 
free movement law, since there was no cross-border element. The Court 
managed to find a way around this by focussing on the 'genuine enjoyment of 
the substance'44 of the children's free movement rights under Article 20 
TFEU. If the family were deported from Belgium, the children would not be 
able to exercise their free movement rights to move freely between EU 
                                                 
41 Snell (n 3). 
42 Case C-60/00 Mary Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
EU:C:2002:434. 
43 Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l'emploi, EU:C:2011:124. 
44 Ibid, para 42. 
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Member States. This would deprive them of the genuine enjoyment of their 
rights.  
Although Carpenter and Ruiz Zambrano were strongly influenced by the 
Court's aim to protect the right to family life,45 the technique used in both 
cases is similar to the market access test. In both cases, the Court reasoned 
from restriction to scope, and there was no clear distinction between the two 
steps. The burden of proof then shifted to the Member State to show that 
the restrictions could be justified and were proportionate. 
2. Horizontal Direct Effect: Interaction between Direct Effect and Restriction 
In the last decades, the free movement provisions have increasingly been 
applied to the actions of private parties. While there has never been much 
doubt that the free movement provisions had vertical direct effect, the extent 
to which private parties were also bound by them has been a topic of 
significant debate.46 Already in 1974, the Court held in Walrave and Koch that 
the free movement provisions did not only apply to State measures, but that 
they also applied to actions of private parties that were 'aimed at regulating 
in a collective manner gainful employment and the provision of services'.47 
The Court based this on the need to preserve the effective and uniform 
application of the free movement provisions.48 In some Member States 
certain activities were regulated by public authorities, while in other Member 
States these activities were regulated by private parties.49 The actions of both 
                                                 
45 Spaventa, 'From Gebhard to Carpenter' (n 7) 767-768. 
46 See Bacquero Cruz (n 3); Krenn (n 3); Mirjam De Mol, 'The Novel Approach of the 
CJEU on the Horizontal Direct Effect of the EU Principle of Non-Discrimination' 
(2011) 18 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 109; Eva Lohse, 
'Fundamental Freedoms and Private Actors – towards an 'Indirect Horizontal 
Effect' (2007) 13 European Public Law 159; Gareth Davies, 'Freedom of Movement, 
Horizontal Effect, and Freedom of Contract' (2012) 3 European Review of Private 
Law 805; Jukka Snell, 'Private Parties and the Free Movement of Goods and 
Services' in Mads Andenas and Wulf-Henning Roth (eds), Services and Free 
Movement in EU Law (Oxford University Press 2002). 
47 Case 36/74Walrave and Koch (n 15), paras 17-18. 
48 Stefaan van den Bogaert, 'Horizontality: The Court Attacks?' in Catherine Barnard 
and Joanne Scott (eds), The Law of the Single European Market: Unpacking the Premises 
(Hart Publishing 2002), 123-152. 
49 Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch (n 15), para 19. 
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public and private parties had to be open to review under free movement law 
to ensure that the free movement provisions were applied effectively and 
uniformly.  
In Walrave and Koch, it appears that two criteria were used to determine 
whether the actions of a private party could be reviewed under free 
movement law. First of all, the actions had to regulate employment or 
services in a collective manner. Secondly, the obstacles to free movement had 
to result from 'the exercise of legal autonomy' of private parties. Presumably, 
this meant that the private party had to enjoy a position of independence 
from other institutions – in particular, from the State.  
The two criteria in Walrave and Koch were never meant to be formalistic – 
they were always supposed to be functional. The problem with the criteria is 
that the Court has never defined what it means by 'collective regulation' and 
'legal autonomy'. The Walrave and Koch formula is used to justify the 
application of the free movement to private parties without any attempt by 
the Court to show that these private parties are involved in collective 
regulation and that they exercise legal autonomy.50 The criteria are no more 
than an empty slogan that is used to justify horizontal direct effect. As a 
result, it is unclear precisely how the criteria should be interpreted. How 
broad should the scope of the actions of private parties be for their actions to 
be regarded as 'collective regulation'?51 If a private party is exercising 
regulatory power on the basis of State legislation that defines its powers and 
scope of action, does this private party enjoy 'legal autonomy'? These are all 
important questions that should be relevant to deciding whether the free 
movement provisions can be applied to horizontal disputes. The Court, 
however, has consistently ignored them. Rather, it has adopted an approach 
                                                 
50 Barend van Leeuwen, 'Private Regulation and Public Responsibility in the Internal 
Market' (2014) 33 Yearbook of European Law 277, 282. 
51 Catherine Barnard, 'Viking and Laval: An Introduction' (2008) 10 Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies 462, 473; Anne CL Davies, 'One Step 
Forward, Two Steps Back? The Viking and Laval Cases in the ECJ' (2008) 37 
Industrial Law Journal 26, 136. 
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based on the impact or effect of the actions of private parties on the exercise of 
free movement right by other private parties.52 
This approach, based on an assessment of the effect of private parties' actions 
on the internal market, involves a similar kind of 'backwards' reasoning that 
was identified in the market access approach. It starts with the identification 
of a restriction, which is then used to justify the direct effect of the free 
movement provisions. There is no independent assessment of the direct 
effect issue – the impact of private action determines whether the free 
movement provisions are applicable.  
This approach can most clearly be seen in Fra.bo.53 Fra.bo was an Italian 
manufacturer of copper fittings that connected different pieces of water or 
gas piping. They wanted to place their products on the German market. The 
relevant German legislation on copper fittings required that the products be 
certified. Although they were not formally mentioned in the applicable 
legislation, the only body that offered this kind of certification was the 
Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches ('DVGW'). Although 
Fra.bo's products were initially certified by DVGW, the certification was 
later withdrawn on the basis that Fra.bo did not comply with some of the 
requirements laid down in the technical standard that was used for 
certification by DVGW. Fra.bo wanted to challenge this standard under 
Article 34 TFEU. However, before they could do this, they had to show that 
Article 34 TFEU was directly effective against DVGW – in other words, that 
the certification activities of DVGW could be reviewed under Article 34 
TFEU. A preliminary reference was made to the Court with the main 
question whether DVGW was bound by Article 34 TFEU in the exercise of 
its certification activities. The Court provided a positive reply to this 
question. The structure of its judgment clearly reveals the interaction 
between direct effect and restriction. The Court held that it had to be 
                                                 
52 Harm Schepel, 'Constitutionalising the Market, Marketising the Constitution, 
and to Tell the Difference: On the Horizontal Application of the Free Movement 
Provisions in EU Law' (2012) 18 European Law Journal 177. See also Laurence 
Gormley, 'Private Parties and the Free Movement of Goods: Responsible, 
Irresponsible, or a Lack of Principles?' (2015) 38 Fordham International Law 
Journal 993. 
53 Case C-171/11 Fra.bo SpA v Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches eV, 
EU:C:2012:453. 
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determined whether 'the activities of a private-law body such as the DVGW 
[have] the effect of giving rise to restrictions on the free movement of goods 
in the same manner as do measures imposed by the State'.54 This statement 
makes it very clear that the question of direct effect has become dependent 
on the finding of a restriction. Article 34 TFEU was given direct effect because 
of the existence of a restriction.55 Therefore, the two stages of direct effect 
and restriction have become merged. The result is again that DVGW was put 
in a position where it had to justify the restriction on Fra.bo's right to free 
movement of goods.  
A similar approach can be seen in the Court's case law on the other freedoms. 
Two prominent examples are Viking56 and Laval.57 In these cases, Article 49 
TFEU and Article 56 TFEU were applied to the activities of trade unions. In 
Laval, which concerned the right of a Latvian company to provide services in 
Sweden, the Court simply repeated the Walrave and Koch formula without 
investigating whether the trade unions in this case actually fulfilled the 
criteria.58 As such, the Court did not investigate the role that the Swedish 
legislative framework played in the facilitation of the trade union's actions. 
Similarly, it did not analyse the complicated process of interaction between 
the Swedish State and the trade unions in the regulation of the labour 
market.59 Article 56 TFEU was applied horizontally against the trade unions 
on the basis of the impact of their actions. The blockade created by the trade 
unions had made it impossible for Laval to provide services in Sweden.  
In Viking, a Finnish ferry operator wanted to re-locate one of its ferries from 
Finland to Estonia. This would result in lower wages for the employees. 
                                                 
54 Fra.bo SpA v Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas (n 53) para 26. 
55 Barend van Leeuwen, 'From Status to Impact, and the Role of National 
Legislation: The Application of Article 34 TFEU to a Private Certification 
Organisation in Fra.bo' (2013) 4 European Journal of Risk Regulation 405, 407. See 
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56 Case C-438/05 Viking (n 1). 
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EU:C:2007:809. 
58 Ibid, para 98. 
59 Barend van Leeuwen, 'An Illusion of Protection and an Assumption of 
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Again, local trade unions – in co-operation with international trade unions – 
managed to prevent Viking from exercising its free movement rights. In 
Viking, the Court actually made an effort to apply the Walrave and Koch 
criteria to the case. First, the Court held that the actions of the trade unions 
were 'aimed at the conclusion of an agreement which is meant to regulate the 
work of Viking's employees collectively'.60 Second, although the trade unions 
were not public authorities, they 'exercise the legal autonomy conferred on 
them, inter alia, by national law'.61 Nevertheless, the Court again integrated 
the concept of restriction into the direct effect analysis, when it stated that 
it did not matter that 'the restriction at issue in the proceedings before the 
national court stems from the exercise of a right conferred by Finnish 
national law, such as, in this case, the right to take collective action, including 
the right to strike'.62  
Overall, in both cases, the Court was heavily influenced by the significant 
impact the actions of trade unions had had on the exercise of free movement 
rights by other private parties. The Court did not investigate whether it was 
legitimate to expect trade unions to comply with the free movement 
provisions in light of their role in the legislative framework which had been 
created by the Member States in which they were operating.  
The result of this process of 'backwards' reasoning is that the concepts of 
direct effect and restriction have merged to such an extent that a finding of 
direct effect in horizontal situations automatically means that there is also a 
restriction. Again, this means that private parties will be required to justify 
the restriction and to show that it is proportionate. The broader consequence 
is that discussions about horizontal direct effect are no longer about the 
question of what sort of organisations or entities should be bound by the free 
movement provisions. The main focus has now shifted to the question of 
what impact is required for the free movement provisions to be applicable. 
The risk of such an approach is that private parties who are able to restrict 
free movement rights of other parties can be held accountable under free 
movement law. This includes the possibility of private liability for breaches 
of the free movement provisions. However, it is uncertain whether the 
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imposition of liability on private parties is justified solely on the basis of an 
assessment of the impact of their actions.63 It might be necessary to 
investigate more closely the context and the regulatory framework in which 
private action takes place. With an effects-based approach to direct effect, 
this important context is missing in the analysis. 
3. Assimilation of Justifications: Interaction between Restriction and Justification 
The third process of interaction that will be analysed is the assimilation of 
Treaty and case law-based justifications. It will be shown that this involves a 
similar kind of backwards reasoning and merging of two stages of inquiry. 
Moreover, this process leads directly to the result that the outcome of cases 
is determined by the proportionality test.  
In Cassis de Dijon, the Court held that indistinctly applicable measures could 
not only be justified by Treaty justifications, but also by mandatory 
requirements such as consumer protection or environmental protection.64 It 
was based on the Court's recognition that the justifications listed in the 
Treaty were relatively limited and, moreover, that they did not reflect the 
current social and technological reality. The Court held that this could force 
Member States to take measures for reasons that were not anticipated at the 
time when the justifications were originally included in the Treaty. 
Furthermore, it reflects the idea that the internal market is about more than 
just market integration, and that it also respects non-economic values that 
are of importance not only to the Member States, but also to the EU. As a 
result, mandatory requirements provided a new source of justifications to 
Member States.65 From the perspective of the Member States, the advantage 
of this source is that it is open-ended. In principle, it is always possible for a 
Member State to rely on a particular reason to restrict free movement. 
Through the case law it is possible to make a long list with very diverse 
mandatory requirements that have been accepted by the Court.66 At the same 
time, the Court has always limited the kind of measures that could be justified 
                                                 
63 van Leeuwen (n 50) 294-296. 
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65 See also Joanne Scott, 'Mandatory or Imperative Requirements in the EU and the 
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by mandatory requirements – they could only justify indistinctly applicable 
or indirectly discriminatory measures. This is because distinctly applicable 
measures are considered to restrict free movement in the most serious way.  
From early on, this rule has resulted in a tension between 'good reasons' and 
'bad measures'. Even distinctly applicable measures are sometimes adopted 
for good reasons that have not been included in the Treaty. As a consequence, 
the Court has been confronted with a number of cases in which pressure was 
exercised by the Member State to accept that 'bad measures' had been 
adopted for good reasons. The Court has never expressly departed from the 
orthodox rule, but it has rather attempted to maintain 'a fiction of 
orthodoxy'. In doing so, the Court has reverted to a technique which is 
similar to the one it has used in market access and horizontal direct effect 
cases. It has reasoned backwards from justification to restriction. The two 
separate stages of inquiry have been merged with a view to provide the 
Member State the opportunity to justify the measure and to proceed to the 
proportionality test. In all cases, the process of merging the restriction and 
justification analysis necessarily meant that Member States were given the 
chance to show that their measures were proportionate. If this technique had 
not been used, the ground of justification would not have been accepted and 
the Court would not even have reached the proportionality stage. 
One of the clearest examples of this technique is PreussenElektra.67 In his 
Opinion, Advocate General Jacobs claimed that the classification of the 
restriction was separate from the assessment of the justification.68 He used 
this to argue in favour of an approach whereby the Court would accept that 
mandatory requirements could be used to justify both distinctly and 
indistinctly applicable measures. His main argument in favour of this change 
was legal certainty – the current flexible application of the rule was 
unpredictable.69 The main argument against this approach is that the Court 
would effectively be re-writing the Treaty, and that the Member States have 
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– despite numerous Treaty amendments – never made use of the possibility 
to include additional justifications in the Treaty.70 This could lead to the 
conclusion that the Member States are actually quite satisfied with the 
current balance between the strict formulation of the rule and the application 
of the rule in practice. Regardless of whether the assimilation of the Treaty 
derogations and mandatory requirements is a good development, the focus 
will now be on the technique that the Court has used to 'keep up 
appearances'.  
In PreussenElektra, Schleswig-Holstein – one of the German Länder – had 
adopted legislation that required energy suppliers in Germany to buy a 
certain percentage of renewable energy that had been produced in Germany. 
As such, the rule made a direct distinction between energy produced in 
Germany and energy produced in other Member States. Schleswig-Holstein 
wanted to justify this rule on the ground of environmental protection. 
However, a classification of the rule as distinctly applicable would prevent 
them from doing so, since environmental protection is not a Treaty 
derogation. For that reason, the Court deliberately avoided classifying the 
measure as distinctly applicable. All it did was to say that the measure was 
'capable, at least potentially, of hindering intra-Community trade'.71 The 
deliberate omission to mention the rule's distinct applicability enabled the 
Court to find that the restriction could be justified on the ground of 
environmental protection. However, the Court was well aware that this was 
a somewhat controversial move, and to mitigate its impact the Court also 
stated that environmental protection could in fact be regarded as part of the 
Treaty derogation to protect the health and life of humans, animals or plants. 
Overall, PreussenElektra provides a good example of a case where the Court's 
determination of the availability of a justification preceded its analysis of the 
restriction.  
Although the discussion about the assimilation of justifications has been 
most prominent in the free movement of goods, there have also been cases in 
the other freedoms where the Court has used a similar approach. In Kohll,72 a 
Luxembourg national applied for prior authorisation for his daughter to 
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receive orthodontic treatment in Germany. Reimbursement of the costs of 
healthcare services in another Member State could only be obtained after 
prior authorisation had been given. Moreover, the procedure for prior 
authorisation did not apply to orthodontic treatment in Luxembourg. On 
that basis, the requirement clearly made a distinction between services 
received in Luxembourg and services received abroad. Despite this 
distinction, the Court stated that 'such rules deter insured persons from 
approaching providers of medical services established in another Member 
State and constitute, for them and their patients, a barrier to freedom to 
provide services'.73 The classification of the restriction as a barrier was 
influenced by the fact that Luxembourg wanted to rely on an objective 
justification – maintaining the financial balance of the social security system. 
This would not have been possible if the rule had been classified as directly 
discriminatory or distinctly applicable. As a result, the Court again connected 
the concepts of restriction and justification to enable the Member State to 
provide a justification and to decide the case through the application of the 
proportionality test. 
IV. THE CENTRALISATION OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE INTERNAL 
MARKET 
1. The Centralisation of Proportionality and the Effet Utile of the Free Movement 
Provisions 
The analysis of the developments in free movement law has shown that the 
Court has used a similar technique in all three developments. Firstly, the 
Court has abandoned its consecutive approach to the structure of free 
movement law. The Court has used an approach which has been referred to 
as 'backwards' reasoning – it has reasoned backwards from one of the pillars 
of the structure of free movement law to what used to be a preceding stage of 
inquiry. Secondly, the Court has no longer made a clear distinction between 
what were previously distinct stages of inquiry. The two stages of inquiry have 
become fused or merged to such an extent that they can no longer be regarded 
as separate. The focus of the analysis so far has been on how these 
developments have taken place in free movement law. The next step will be 
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to assess why these developments have taken place and what their 
consequences are. The aim will be to look at the motivation for the processes 
of restructuring that have taken place in free movement law, and to analyse 
their effects. Finally, a link will be made between the aim and the 
consequences of the processes of restructuring.  
If the three developments are combined, it becomes clear that there is one 
concept that unites them all. This is the concept of restriction – the 
restriction stage of inquiry plays a central role in each of the developments. 
However, this role is not identical. With market access and horizontal direct 
effect, the Court has reasoned from restriction to scope and direct effect. As 
a result, the concept of restriction has become the starting point of the 
Court's analysis. This has been different for the assimilation of express 
derogations and public interest justifications, where the Court has reasoned 
from justification to restriction. As such, the concept of restriction was the 
destination – not the starting point. Nevertheless, the central position of the 
concept of restriction shows why the developments have taken place. The 
Court's main concern has been to protect the effet utile of the free movement 
provisions – to guarantee the effective functioning of the internal market. 
The term effet utile has often been used in a rather abstract way,74 but a 
structural analysis shows which elements the Court considers important to 
guarantee the effective application of the free movement provisions. The 
impact of measures or actions on the exercise of free movement rights 
becomes crucial. The market access approach is based on an analysis of the 
impact of national rules on the ability of companies or individuals to exercise 
their free movement rights. Based on this presumption or finding of impact, 
cases are brought in the scope of free movement law. Similarly, horizontal 
direct effect has developed in such a way that the effect of the actions of 
private parties has become the Court's main yardstick in deciding whether 
private parties should be bound by the free movement provisions. In both 
situations, the impact of measures or conduct has encouraged the Court to 
rethink the structure of free movement law.  
A similar argument cannot be made to explain the assimilation of the 
justifications. The reasoning from justification to restriction does not start 
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by looking at the impact of actions. On the contrary, it directly affects the 
assessment of whether there is impact on free movement law. The 
classification of the breach is determined on the basis of the justification 
relied on by the Member State. The assimilation of the express derogations 
and public interest justifications shows that the Court considers the internal 
market – and the free movement provisions – as a balancing exercise between 
economic and non-economic interests. Keck already confirmed that the 
Court does not regard the internal market as a free market in which the 
unhindered pursuit of economic freedom can be exercised. The internal 
market is supposed to offer equal opportunities, but in offering equal 
opportunities different values – both economic and non-economic – should 
be taken into account. This means that the Court has to balance economic 
rights with social rights,75 and economic rights with fundamental human 
rights.76 The internal market in itself is a construct that involves a constant 
balancing exercise. As a result, it is not problematic for a justification relied 
on to have a direct impact on the Court's classification of the restriction, as 
long as this justification is consistent with the perceived aim of the internal 
market. As such, the aim of the free movement provisions is relied on to 
redefine the impact of measures on the internal market – and, in doing so, to 
redefine the concept of restriction in free movement law. 
Finally, it should be analysed what the result of the restructuring of the 
structure of free movement law is. Each of the three developments makes it 
more likely – if not inevitable – that the outcome of free movement cases is 
determined by the application of the proportionality test. The assimilation 
of the justifications results directly in the application of the proportionality 
test – if the ground of justification is accepted and leads to a reclassification 
of the restriction, the immediate next step for the Court is to assess the 
proportionality of the measure. The market access approach and horizontal 
direct effect do not immediately lead to the application of the 
proportionality test. After all, it will first have to be shown that there is a 
ground of justification. However, in combination with the assimilation of the 
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justifications, it is likely that the proportionality test will be decisive. As a 
result, the proportionality test has obtained a more prominent role in the 
structure of free movement. It could almost be said that 'all roads lead to 
proportionality'. This centralisation of proportionality shows that the Court 
is confident to rely on the proportionality test to decide free movement cases.  
This central role for proportionality can be linked to the aim of the processes 
of restructuring. The increasing significance of proportionality shows that 
the Court believes that the effective application of the free movement 
provisions can best be guaranteed by the proportionality test. A direct link is 
made between the proportionality test and the effet utile of free movement 
law. This is not entirely surprising. Two important reasons for the Court's 
increasing reliance on proportionality can be identified. First, the 
proportionality test involves a balancing exercise. It provides a tool through 
which the various interests in a case can be balanced.77 As such, it is consistent 
and compatible with a vision of the internal market as a balancing exercise 
between economic and non-economic interests.78 This balancing exercise 
can directly be achieved through the application of the proportionality test.79 
Second, the Court has developed the proportionality test in such a way that 
its application is inherently flexible.80 It is flexible in at least two ways. The 
intensity of review can be adapted – in more sensitive areas the Court is more 
willing to adopt a hands-off approach. Second, the Court has been flexible in 
deciding who should conduct the proportionality test – the Court itself or the 
national court. In certain cases, the Court is prepared to leave a broad margin 
of assessment to the national court, while in other cases the Court more or 
less reserves the proportionality test to itself. From this perspective, it is not 
surprising that proportionality has obtained such an important role in free 
movement law.  
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2. The Consequences of the Centralisation of Proportionality 
It has been shown how and why proportionality has obtained a central 
position in the structure of free movement law. Two dimensions of this 
process of centralisation will now be analysed – the first is more procedural, 
the second more substantive. They are closely linked to the two 
characteristics of the proportionality test – the balancing exercise and its 
flexible application – that have made the test suitable for a central role in free 
movement law.  
The first dimension that is affected by the centralisation of proportionality 
is the relationship between the Court and national courts. If free movement 
cases are increasingly decided through the application of the proportionality 
test, this has an impact on the role that national courts play in deciding free 
movement cases. There is a real risk that centralisation of the proportionality 
test might similarly result in a more central role for the Court. This is, first of 
all, because it is difficult for national courts to assess to what extent the 
proportionality test is within their own control. It is very difficult to 
systemise the Court's case law in such a way that national courts can say with 
a certain degree of certainty that they are able to conduct the proportionality 
test themselves. Secondly, it is very complicated for national courts to decide 
if the outcome of the proportionality test is sufficiently clear not to have to 
make a preliminary reference to the Court. The outcome of the balancing 
exercise involved in the proportionality test is not easy to predict.81 This 
would be another reason for national courts to make a reference to 
Luxembourg. The result is that the Court obtains a central role in deciding 
free movement cases. Since cases in Luxembourg are not exactly dealt with 
quickly, it is doubtful whether this is helpful for the effective application of 
the free movement provisions. Furthermore, because of the inherent 
flexibility of the application of the proportionality test, a more central role 
for the Court does not help from the perspective of the uniform application 
of free movement law. The outcome of the proportionality test is often fact-
specific. Therefore, cases that are decided through the proportionality test 
are generally not of much assistance to national courts or litigants who might 
be involved in litigation with similar characteristics.   
                                                 
81 Sauter (n 80). 
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The second dimension that is affected by the centralisation of 
proportionality is the relationship between the State and its citizens. More 
precisely, it affects the relationship between those who make rules that have 
an impact on the internal market – this could be the State or private parties – 
and those who are affected by these rules. The flexible application of the 
proportionality test leads to a certain degree of substantive uncertainty. This 
uncertainty makes it more difficult for parties with regulatory power to 
decide how to exercise that power. Similarly, it becomes more difficult for 
those who are affected by rules to decide whether to challenge them. As such, 
a central role for proportionality also affects legal certainty – not just in the 
relationship between courts, but also in the relationship between rule-makers 
and those affected by the rules. The significant variation in the intensity with 
which national rules or measures are reviewed makes it difficult to decide 
whether rules are proportionality-proof. It puts a significant burden on those 
who defend national rules and those who want to attack them to predict with 
what intensity rules could be reviewed and what the outcome of the review 
will be.82 Moreover, legal certainty is necessary for individuals or companies 
to have the confidence to exercise their free movement rights. Although the 
proportionality test will always be important in free movement law, the other 
pillars of the structure of free movement law create more legal certainty in 
the internal market. 
Overall, the centralisation of proportionality affects both the uniform 
application of the free movement provisions and legal certainty. These two 
concepts are also fundamental to the effet utile of the free movement 
provisions. Although the proportionality test might at first appear to be a 
suitable tool to guarantee the effective application of the free movement 
provisions, too much and too exclusive reliance on proportionality is 
ultimately not in the best interests of the internal market.83 For that reason, 
the Court should not be afraid to rely more on the concepts of scope, direct 
                                                 
82 Jan Jans, 'Proportionality Revisited' (2000) 27 Legal Issues of Economic 
Integration 239. See also Gráinne de Búrca, 'The Principle of Proportionality and 
its Application in EC Law' (1993) 13 Yearbook of European Law 105. 
83 See also Tor Inge Harbo, 'The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU 
Law' (2010) 16 European Law Journal 158. 
2017}  The Structure of Free Movement Law 263 
 
 
effect and justification to decide free movement cases. The advantage of 
these pillars of the structure is that their application is more predictable.  
The centralisation of proportionality has resulted in the neglect of some of 
the other tools in the structure of free movement law. The Court has to 
provide more guidance on which cases fall within the scope of the free 
movement provisions,84 on the question in which situations private parties 
are bound to comply with the free movement provisions, and on which 
justifications are available to justify restrictions on free movement. As 
regards the scope of free movement law, the Court should be more precise 
about the cross-border impact that is required for cases to come within the 
scope of the free movement provisions. Clarification is required about the 
circumstances in which a hypothetical impact on free movement is sufficient. 
For horizontal direct effect, the Court should provide more substance to the 
concepts of collective regulation and legal autonomy laid down in Walrave 
and Koch. Private parties have to know in which circumstances or under what 
conditions they are expected to comply with the free movement provisions. 
The Court has not provided the required clarification in cases like Viking, 
Laval and Fra.bo. Finally, the Court should provide a list of mandatory 
requirements that can be used to justify distinctly applicable or directly 
discriminatory restrictions. If the assimilation of justifications was only 
necessary to provide a more prominent role to environmental protection – 
which is often considered the 'special one' among mandatory requirements – 
the Court should explicitly acknowledge this. To conclude, the Court has to 
give more guidance on the application of the pillars of the structure. Such 
guidance cannot be developed if cases are predominantly decided by relying 
on the proportionality test.  
In the end, a more developed and precise approach to the scope of free 
movement, to direct effect and to the justifications will improve legal 
certainty in the internal market. If these concepts are developed more 
precisely and coherently, this will increase the confidence of national courts 
in applying them. Furthermore, it will provide more legal certainty to public 
and private parties that are exercising regulatory power in the internal 
market. In combination with the proportionality test, this structure of free 
                                                 
84 A good start has been made in Case C-268/15 Fernand Ullens de Schooten v État belge, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:874. 
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movement law provides a solid foundation that is able to guarantee the 
effective functioning of the internal market. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Market access, horizontal direct effect and the assimilation of justifications 
– three phenomena that have dominated discussions about free movement 
law in the last decades. This article has not attempted to provide 
revolutionary new definitions or interpretations of these developments. 
Rather, it has sought to combine them by choosing the perspective of the 
structure of free movement law. This perspective shows that the three 
developments are connected and have had the same consequences. The 
analysis has resulted in three main conclusions.  
Firstly, the Court has used the same technique in market access, horizontal 
direct effect and assimilation of the justifications cases. This technique is 
based on 'backwards' reasoning from one pillar of the structure to what used 
to be a preceding pillar of the structure. The consecutive order of the 
structure of free movement law has been abandoned. Moreover, what used to 
be two separate stages of inquiry are no longer regarded as separate. They 
have become merged in such a way that it has become difficult to distinguish 
between them.  
Secondly, for all three developments, the concept of restriction is either the 
'starting point' or the 'destination' of the Court's reasoning. As a result, it is 
clear that the Court is concerned with guaranteeing the effective application 
of the free movement provisions. In order to do this, it is necessary to keep 
the aim of the free movement provisions in mind. They represent a balancing 
exercise between economic and non-economic interests. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the proportionality test has become the Court's favourite tool 
to decide free movement cases.  
Thirdly, the centralisation of proportionality in the internal market has 
important consequences. It affects the relationship between the Court and 
national courts, and it also affects the relationship between the State and its 
citizens. Although it is understandable that the flexibility of the 
proportionality test makes it a suitable tool to decide free movement cases, 
the uniform application of the free movement provisions and  
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legal certainty are not necessarily improved by a central role for 
proportionality. As a consequence, the Court should be encouraged 
 to not only rely on the proportionality test to decide free movement  
cases, but also to use other concepts in the structure of free  
movement law. This is not criticism of the proportionality test as such,  
but rather of the role that proportionality has been given. The centralised  
role of proportionality in free movement law should be reconsidered.
